Landmark Judgment Summaries

(i) Whether the judgments of the NCLT and NCLAT, which relied on six AI-generated citations later found to be either wholly non-existent or attributed with non-existent paragraphs, can be sustained in law.

(ii) What directions are needed to prevent members of the Bar from citing or relying on AI-generated fake or hallucinated material as precedent, and what consequence follows for a decision tainted by such material.

The Appellant is a suspended director of Essel Infraprojects Ltd. ("EIL"), the corporate debtor and corporate guarantor of the original borrower, Pan India Utilities Distribution Company Ltd. ("PIUDCL"). PIUDCL took loan facilities from Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd., Respondent No. 1, secured by a corporate guarantee executed by EIL. PIUDCL later defaulted, and its loan accounts were classified as non-performing assets.

Respondent No. 1 filed an application under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”) before the NCLT, Mumbai, seeking initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution process against EIL. The NCLT admitted the application on 28.08.2024, appointed an Interim Resolution Professional, and declared a moratorium under Section 14 of the Code. The appellant challenged the admission order before the NCLAT, disputing her liability as guarantor.

The NCLAT dismissed the appeal on 11.09.2025. In support of its finding, the NCLAT referred to six judgments the NCLT had relied on.

Before the Supreme Court, Senior Counsel for the appellant pointed out that the citations relied on by the NCLT, as reproduced by the NCLAT, were fake and non-existent, and appeared to be AI-generated. Even where a citation was genuine, the paragraphs extracted from it could not be traced to the actual judgment.

Verification of the citations

The Supreme Court noted that it was not in dispute that the judgments relied on by the NCLT were non-existent, and that some AI-generated paragraphs had been wrongly attributed to genuine citations. The Court held that an independent examination by it  confirmed this. Of the six citations of the NCLT judgment, two carried correct citations but were attributed with non-existent paragraphs. One citation was found to actually belong to a different, existing judgment, and was likewise attributed with a non-existent paragraph. The remaining three were non-existent citations altogether (¶15).

The Supreme Court observed  that Respondent No. 1 had filed an affidavit confirming that these judgments were not cited by its counsel at the bar, and that the NCLT appeared to have sourced them through its own research (¶16). The Court further observed that the fake citations had also escaped scrutiny at the first appellate stage before the NCLAT (¶16).

AI's role in adjudication

The Supreme Court reasoned that AI has acquired the capability to substantially aid, if not fully substitute, human effort, both routine and intellectual, and that this capability is compelling professionals to adopt it for efficient functioning (¶2).

The Supreme Court noted that reliance on technology is not new to the justice system, since courts have long absorbed new technologies into their processes. It held, however, that AI is different in kind, since it does not merely aid human work but offers itself as an alternative to human thinking, reasoning, and decision-making, which calls for extra caution (¶3).The Court reasoned  that the capacity to think, to distinguish right from wrong and fact from fiction, is central to human existence and is built through deliberate and disciplined practice (¶4).

Need for control and regulation

The Supreme Court held that it is necessary to maintain absolute control over the application of AI in adjudication. It reasoned that such control lies in making deliberate choices about when and where AI is used (¶5). It emphasised that this issue is ultimately one for public policy and enforceable regulation, not judicial orders. It noted that the process of framing such regulations has already commenced (¶5). 

The Supreme Court held that the tendency of AI to generate non-existent or hallucinated results, when introduced into adjudication, is comparable in its invisible and catastrophic effect to the release of a toxic gas, in that it contaminates the very lifeblood of judicial determination before its presence is even noticed (¶6).

Zero tolerance for hallucinated precedent

The Supreme Court held that it is necessary for Courts to adopt a zero-tolerance approach to producing, citing, or using AI-generated precedents without verification (¶7). It held that it is misconduct for an advocate to cite such material without verification, and equally a serious lapse for a judge to rely on it. It held that a decision is no decision in law if any fake or hallucinated material entered the decision-making process, regardless of whether it had a direct or indirect bearing on the outcome, since this violates the sanctity of adjudication (¶7). The Court clarified that this ruling does not affect the legitimate use of AI, but only the presentation of fake or hallucinated material as if it were genuine precedent (¶7).

Direction to the Bar Council of India

The Supreme Court held that a mere declaration of prohibition is not enough without accountability (¶8). It directed the Bar Council of India, as the apex statutory body, to constitute a committee. This committee is to deliberate on advocates submitting fake or hallucinated material as precedent and prescribe guiding principles and disciplinary consequences for such conduct (¶9).

Subversion of the rule of law 

The Supreme Court held that the judicial process and the judgment under challenge stood tainted by material presented as precedent, which in reality was unreal and did not exist. It held that a decision based on such fake and hallucinated material is no decision at all, and amounts to a subversion of the rule of law. It held that such a decision is unsustainable and must be set aside at the earliest opportunity (¶17).

Prepared by: 

Centre for Research and Planning, Supreme Court of India

(i) Whether the Election Commission of India  (“the Election Commission”)  has power to conduct a Special Intensive Revision (“SIR”) of electoral rolls in Bihar. 

(ii) Whether the exercise was founded on a legitimate purpose and whether the measures adopted were proportionate to the object sought to be achieved. 

(iii) Whether the procedure adopted was contrary to the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (“RP Act”) and the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960.

(iv) Whether the Election Commission is empowered to scrutinise the citizenship status of persons seeking inclusion or continuation in the electoral roll.

On 24 June 2025, the Election Commission issued an order directing a SIR of electoral rolls in every Assembly constituency of Bihar in exercise of its powers under Article 324 of the Constitution read with Section 21(3) of the RP Act. The Election Commission recorded that the last intensive revision in Bihar had been conducted in 2003 and that over the intervening two decades, the rolls had been updated only through summary revisions. Rapid urbanisation, large-scale migration, non-reporting of deaths, and duplication of entries had significantly eroded the accuracy of the electoral rolls.

Under the SIR framework, electors appearing in the 2003 electoral roll were treated as presumptively eligible and were not required to furnish additional documents. Persons not listed in the 2003 roll were required to submit an Enumeration Form along with one or more government documents from a prescribed list of eleven, by 25 July 2025, failing which their names would not be included in the draft roll. Booth Level Officers conducted house-to-house visits to distribute pre-filled forms and collect the completed ones. Where the eligibility of any elector was found doubtful after publication of the draft roll, the Electoral Registration Officer was required to issue a show-cause notice, allow a response, and pass a reasoned order. A two-tier appellate mechanism was provided under Section 24 of the RP Act.

Several writ petitions were filed before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of the exercise. On expiry of the submission deadline, nearly 65 lakh electors stood excluded from the draft roll published on 1 August 2025, as against 7.89 crore electors on the roll before the exercise commenced. During the proceedings, the Court directed the Election Commission to publish the list of excluded electors with reasons for exclusion, required twelve political parties to deploy their Booth Level Agents to assist excluded voters, and directed the Commission to treat the Aadhaar Card as a twelfth document of identity for establishing identity under Section 23(4) of the RP Act, clarifying that it is not proof of citizenship under the Aadhaar Act. The Election Commission declared the completion of the SIR by a press release dated 30 September 2025. The final electoral roll contained 7.42 crore electors. Elections to the Bihar Legislative Assembly were held in November 2025 and results were declared on 14 November 2025.

Power to conduct a Special Intensive Revision

The Supreme Court held that Articles 324 and 327 of the Constitution are complementary and not competing repositories of power. The Court found that while Article 327 empowers Parliament to make laws on electoral matters, such law-making power is expressly made subject to the provisions of the Constitution, including Article 324. The Court reasoned that parliamentary legislation cannot extinguish the constitutional functions vested in the Election Commission, and the Election Commission's powers under Article 324 must in turn be exercised consistently with valid parliamentary law (¶17-18).

The Supreme Court held that the proposition that Article 324 operates exclusively in areas completely untouched by legislation is legally untenable. The Court held that Article 324 remains plenary and vests the Commission with all powers necessary to preserve the integrity of the electoral process. The Court ruled that the Commission retains authority to act in its own right as a constitutional authority, provided it does not act contrary to an express statutory prohibition (¶¶ 18-26).

The Supreme Court held that Section 21(3) of the RP Act constitutes an autonomous statutory source of power for directing a special revision. The Court found that the non-obstante clause frees the exercise from the procedural limitations of ordinary revision under Section 21(2), and that the expressions "at any time", "for reasons to be recorded", and "in such manner as it may think fit" collectively vest the Commission with wide temporal, substantive, and procedural latitude (¶¶33-35). The Court further held that the word "any" before "constituency" is capable of meaning "all" or "many" depending on context, and that where the reasons for revision are statewide, the Commission may cover all constituencies through a single order (¶ 50). The Court found that the Commission provided cogent justification for initiating the SIR, namely demographic change, large-scale migration, duplication of entries, and its constitutional obligation under Article 326 to ensure that only Indian citizens are enrolled (¶¶ 44-46).

Legitimate Purpose and Proportionality

The Supreme Court held that the twin objectives of the SIR, being the inclusion of all eligible electors and the exclusion of ineligible persons, are deeply embedded in Articles 325 and 326 of the Constitution. The Court found that the factors identified by the Commission, namely non-reporting of deaths, migration, and enrolment of disqualified persons, map directly onto the statutory grounds for deletion under Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules. The Court reasoned that initiating the SIR to address these conditions is consistent with the legislative scheme (¶¶ 63-69).

The Supreme Court held that the measures adopted by the Commission bear a direct and rational nexus to the objective of restoring the accuracy of the electoral roll (¶¶70-75). The Court ruled that the enquiry under the necessity limb of proportionality is not whether the Court would have adopted a different method but whether the measure chosen is so disproportionate as to be constitutionally unsustainable. The Court found that where a problem is systemic and accumulated over two decades, a comprehensive statewide revision cannot be said to be manifestly excessive merely because targeted alternatives were conceivable (¶¶ 78-86). The Court further held that the right to vote, while a constitutional right, is not absolute and contemplates a framework of verification and periodic revision. The Court found that the procedural safeguards embedded in the exercise, together with the structural correctives introduced through judicial directions during the proceedings, struck a fair balance between electoral integrity and the imperative of inclusion (¶¶ 87-103).

Presumption of Validity and the 2003 Baseline

The Supreme Court held that inclusion in the electoral roll gives rise to a rebuttable evidentiary presumption of validity, traceable to Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872, that the conditions for inclusion were duly satisfied at the time of entry (¶111). The Court ruled that this presumption cannot be elevated into a conclusive rule of substantive law that forecloses the Commission's power to undertake a systemic verification exercise. The Court found that the decision in Lal Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer (1995 INSC 98)  was rendered in the context of individual adjudicatory proceedings and does not extend to a systemic, inquisitorial exercise conducted in furtherance of the Commission's constitutional mandate (¶¶113-115).

The Supreme Court held that the selection of the 2003 roll as the reference point is not arbitrary. The Court found that the 2003 revision was itself a Special Intensive Revision entailing a far more rigorous process of verification than subsequent summary revisions, and that attaching greater reliability to it bears a rational nexus to the object of ensuring the accuracy and integrity of the electoral roll (¶¶123-124).

Compliance with Rule 21A and the Documentation Regime

The Supreme Court held that the SIR framework does not abrogate the safeguards of Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules. The Court found that the essential requirements of that Rule, namely identification of doubtful entries, notice to the concerned elector, and a reasoned determination after hearing, are operationalised across successive stages of the SIR process. The Court reasoned that non-inclusion in the draft roll is a provisional step and that finality attaches only after the process of scrutiny, notice, inquiry, and hearing is complete (¶¶ 140-142).

The Supreme Court held that the Commission is entitled to prescribe a documentation regime suited to the exigencies of a Special Intensive Revision. The Court found that the exclusion of ration cards is supported by concerns of evidentiary reliability. The Court further held that the exclusion of the Elector Photo Identity Card (“EPIC”) is inherent in the logic of the exercise, since the EPIC is itself issued on the basis of inclusion in the very roll that the Commission seeks to verify (¶¶ 158-159).

Citizenship Scrutiny by the Election  Commission

The Supreme Court held that citizenship is a condition precedent for registration as an elector under Article 326 of the Constitution read with Section 16 of the RP Act, and that the Commission cannot discharge its obligation to maintain a valid electoral roll without satisfying itself on this requirement (¶173). The Court found that there is a principled distinction between a formal adjudication of citizenship under the Citizenship Act, 1955, which falls within the exclusive domain of the Competent Authority, and the Commission's limited administrative inquiry into eligibility for enrolment. The Court ruled that the Commission's inquiry is confined to electoral purposes and does not amount to a determination of citizenship in the strict sense (¶¶ 174-176).

The Supreme Court ruled that where the Commission is not satisfied a person meets the statutory conditions for inclusion, it must refer that person to the Central Government's competent authority for adjudication. The Commission's own determination, being confined to electoral purposes, cannot become final on citizenship. Any deletion on this ground stays subject to the outcome of that adjudication (¶186(g)).

The Court directed that, for persons deleted from the 2003 roll on the Commission's opinion that they are not citizens, the Commission must refer such cases to the Competent Authority under the Citizenship Act, 1955 within four weeks. The Competent Authority must decide these cases in accordance with law, preferably before the next Parliamentary, Assembly, or Local Body election, whichever comes first, after giving notice and a hearing to the deleted individuals. If the Competent Authority finds them to be citizens, they must be included in the electoral roll. In addition, persons domiciled in Bihar whose names were wrongly deleted on grounds of being absent, dead, shifted, or duplicated may challenge the Commission's decision by way of judicial review (¶186(h)).

Prepared by

Centre for Research and Planning, Supreme Court of India

(i) Whether the Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (“CANH”) constitutes "medical treatment" that can be lawfully withdrawn under the passive euthanasia framework.

(ii) What is the meaning, scope, and contours of the principle of “best interest of the patient” in determining whether medical treatment should be withdrawn or withheld? 

(iii) What directions are to be issued keeping in view the unanimous medical opinion confirming Harish Rana’s irreversible vegetative state, the absence of benefit from continued CANH, and the consideration of non-medical factors and family consultations.

In 2018, the Supreme Court in Common Cause v Union of India [2018 INSC 223] ("Common Cause") held that the right to die with dignity is part of the right to life under Article 21. The Court clarified that euthanasia stays unlawful in India, but withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is legally permissible in certain situations. It set out three points. First, a person with decision-making capacity has the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Second, an adult may execute an Advance Medical Directive ("AMD") setting out their wishes for future treatment if they later lose the capacity to decide. Third, life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from a person lacking decision-making capacity, whether or not they left an AMD. The Court emphasised that a person refusing life-sustaining treatment remains entitled to palliative care and other medical support.

Harish Rana suffered a severe brain injury after falling from a fourth-floor building in August 2013. This left him in a Permanent Vegetative State (“PVS”) with 100% permanent disability. For over thirteen years, he has been bedridden and sustained entirely by CANH through a Percutaneous Endoscopic Gastrostomy ("PEG") tube.

Harish, through his parents, approached the Delhi High Court in 2024 seeking a Medical Board to withdraw the PEG tube. The High Court dismissed the petition on the ground that he was not kept alive mechanically, could sustain himself without external aid, and that active euthanasia was legally impermissible.

The Court had earlier disposed of the Special Leave Petition by its order dated 8 November 2024, noting the parents' satisfaction with the Respondents' efforts to explore alternative care for the petitioner. The Court granted liberty to approach it again through the parents. The parents then filed the Miscellaneous Application that led to this judgment, on the ground that Harish's continued vegetative existence violated his right to live with dignity. The Court constituted Primary and Secondary Medical Boards, which unanimously confirmed that his condition is irreversible and that continuing CANH gave him no therapeutic benefit.

CANH Qualifies as Medical Treatment 

The Supreme Court held that the administration of CANH through a PEG tube involves continuous medical intervention, specialised techniques, regular monitoring, and the risk of complications. For this reason, it cannot be treated as mere basic care, but must be understood as a form of “medical treatment” (¶¶116–128, J. Pardiwala).

In his concurring opinion, Justice Viswanathan agreed with this view and observed that the use of feeding tubes amounts to medical treatment. Consequently, the Applicant’s case fell within the framework laid down in Common Cause (¶¶47, 49, J. Viswanathan).

Active Versus Passive Euthanasia 

The Supreme Court, relying on Common Cause, clarified that the difference between active and passive euthanasia cannot be reduced to a mere distinction between acts and omissions. Active euthanasia involves “causing death” through an external intervention, such as administering a lethal injection, which interrupts the natural process leading to death. Passive euthanasia, on the other hand, is understood as “allowing death to occur” or “letting die.” In such cases, the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment does not cause death directly; rather, it permits the underlying illness or injury to take its natural course (¶45, J. Pardiwala). 

Recognition of non-voluntary passive euthanasia 

The Supreme  Court held that while a competent patient's right to refuse treatment is absolute, passive euthanasia for an incompetent patient is subject to strict procedural safeguards and can only be allowed once certain threshold conditions are met. The Court, while relying on Common Cause, reiterated that such cases are permissible only where the patient is terminally ill, in a PVS or a similar condition; has been undergoing prolonged medical treatment; and the ailment is irreversible, meaning either incurable or beyond any hope of recovery. (¶71J. Pardiwala).

Justice Viswanathan held that the High Court was wrong to reject the petition solely because Harish was not terminally ill (¶36,J. Viswanathan). He observed that under Common Cause, even a patient in PVS suffering from an incurable condition meets the requirements for constituting Medical Boards and withdrawing treatment (¶40, J. Viswanathan).

Application of the “Best Interest of the Patient” Principle 

The Supreme Court reiterated that, in the case of incompetent patients, decisions regarding the withdrawal of medical treatment must be guided by the “best interests of the patient” standard (¶¶132–133, J. Pardiwala). The Court also laid down an illustrative, non-exhaustive set of factors to determine what constitutes the patient’s best interests (¶233, J. Pardiwala; ¶58, J. Viswanathan). These include:

i) a strong presumption in favour of preserving life, rooted in the sanctity of life;
ii) the recognition that this presumption may be displaced where continued treatment no longer advances the patient’s overall welfare;
iii) the need to carefully balance competing considerations;
iv) whether continuing life-prolonging treatment is truly in the patient’s best interests;
v) whether the treatment provides any real benefit to the patient;
vi) whether it serves a therapeutic purpose;
vii) the degree of indignity caused by prolonging treatment;
viii) whether the treatment has become futile;
ix) the considered opinion of competent medical experts;
x) both medical and non-medical considerations, including emotional and welfare concerns; and
xi) consultation with the patient’s family members.

Application to the Harish’s  Case 

The Supreme Court held that continuation of medical treatment was no longer in Harish's “best interests” (¶324,J. Pardiwala; ¶61, J. Viswanathan). The Court relied on the unanimous opinion of the Primary and Secondary Medical Boards, both of which certified that Harish had suffered irreversible brain damage and that continued CANH served no therapeutic purpose. The Court also weighed Harish’s previously active and energetic life, along with his family’s consistent view that he would have regarded such a prolonged vegetative existence as undignified (¶¶234–239, J. Pardiwala; ¶60, J. Viswanathan).

The Supreme Court reasoned that where both the Primary and Secondary Medical Boards approve the withdrawal or withholding of medical treatment, judicial intervention is ordinarily unnecessary, except in limited and exceptional circumstances (¶240, J. Pardiwala).

Transition to Palliative and End of Life (EOL) Care 

The Supreme Court held that the right to die with dignity is inseparable from the right to receive quality palliative and end-of-life care (¶325, J. Pardiwala). The Court emphasised that the withdrawal of treatment cannot be equated with abandonment of the patient. Instead, it requires a shift from curative treatment to a carefully planned and medically supervised regime of palliative and EOL care (¶319, J. Pardiwala).

The Court also strongly criticised the practice of discharging patients “against medical advice” merely because life-sustaining treatment has been withdrawn. It clarified that a decision to withhold or withdraw medical treatment does not result in the loss of a patient’s right to continued medical supervision and care (¶244, J. Pardiwala). At the same time, the Court recognised that home-based care remains legally permissible, including in cases where a “best interests” assessment is being undertaken (¶252, J. Pardiwala).

Streamlining Common Cause Guidelines

The Supreme Court explained and streamlined the principles recognised by Common Cause to address the practical difficulties faced  by stakeholders, acknowledging that doctors remain hesitant and apprehensive about starting this process (¶255, J. Pardiwala).

1. Safeguarding Checkpoints: The Supreme Court reiterated the Common Cause requirement of a collaborative, multi-tiered process, involving Primary and Secondary Medical Boards and the High Court, to keep the process neutral and remove doctors' hesitation.

2. Role of Next of Kin: The Supreme Court held that the Medical Board must identify the patient's caregivers as next of kin, inform them of the pros and cons of withdrawing treatment, and record the minutes of that discussion (¶262, J. Pardiwala). Their written consent, which is mandatory, must reflect the patient's best interests and not merely the parents' preferences (¶263, J. Pardiwala).

3. Home-Care Patients: The Supreme Court held that families of patients treated at home can either admit them to a hospital or approach a hospital solely to have a primary treating physician designated. 

i) The next of kin or guardian may admit the patient to any hospital of their choice, which then bears responsibility for complying with the guidelines (¶266, J. Pardiwala).

 ii) Where admission is not feasible, they may approach a hospital to have a primary treating physician designated, who will assess the patient and start the process (¶266, J. Pardiwala). 

iii) In both situations, medical practitioners and hospitals are expected to assist, not refuse care (¶267, J. Pardiwala).

4. CMO Nominations: The Supreme Court held that to prevent arbitrary discretion in choosing the CMO-nominated practitioner (¶271, J. Pardiwala), Chief Medical Officers in every district must maintain an updated panel of registered practitioners and nominate one to the Secondary Medical Board, preferably within 48 hours of a hospital's request. This panel must be reviewed at intervals not exceeding twelve months (¶272, J. Pardiwala).

5. Reconsideration Period: The Supreme Court held that a 30-day cooling period applies after medical experts agree on withdrawal, during which any aggrieved person with locus may approach a court of law (¶¶274–275, J. Pardiwala).

6. Court Intervention: The Court held that judicial intervention should remain minimal, but a party may approach the High Court under Article 226 if the Medical Boards disagree on withdrawal, or if a hospital fails to constitute a Board (¶¶277–278, J. Pardiwala).

The Need for Legislation 

The Supreme Court held that the prolonged absence of comprehensive legislation on end-of-life care has compelled it, time and again, to step in and fill the vacuum, out of constitutional necessity rather than institutional choice. It held that while the Common Cause guidelines have served as an important interim safeguard to protect the right to live and die with dignity, they were never meant to operate as a permanent substitute for legislation. The Court accordingly urged the Union Government to consider enacting comprehensive legislation on the subject, in line with the vision of the Constitution Bench in Common Cause holding that such legislation would bring more clarity, coherence, and certainty to these practical and emotionally charged issues.

Prepared by Nikhil Kumar Chaubey

Centre for Research and Planning, Supreme Court of India

(i) Whether the accused persons have only ‘prepared’ to commit the offence of rape or moved beyond that to have ‘attempted’ to commit the said crime.

(ii) Whether guidelines are required for inculcating sensitivity and compassion into judicial approach while dealing with matters involving sexual offences.

The Supreme Court registered a suo motu writ petition following a letter from an organisation named ‘We the Women of India’, which highlighted a judgment dated 17.03.2025 passed by a Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court. The letter noted that the observations made and reasoning adopted by the Single Judge was erroneous and insensitive. Similar concerns were also raised in connected matters assailing the same judgment, filed by NGOs registered in Kolkata and Delhi, along with the complainant, who is the mother of the minor victim. 

In the said judgment, the High Court had modified order for summons issued by a Special Judge (POCSO) to two accused persons, revising the charge from Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”) read with Section 18 of the (“POCSO”) to a lesser charge under Section 354B of the IPC read with Section 9 and 10 of POCSO. The Supreme Court on 26.03.2025 stayed the observations of the High Court in paragraphs 21, 24 and 26, and subsequently on 08.12.2025 stayed the operation of the entire judgment of the High Court.

The factual allegations as recorded in the High Court’s Judgment indicated that the accused took a minor victim on their motorcycle under the guise of dropping her home, dragged her near a culvert, and committed sexually offensive acts. They only fled the scene because two witnesses reached after hearing the victim's shrieks. The High Court had concluded that these actions were limited to “preparation” to commit the offence of rape and did not amount to an “attempt”. NGOs and the complainant-mother challenged this decision before the Supreme Court.

A Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court allowed the Criminal Appeals, setting aside the impugned judgment of the High Court dated 17.03.2025. The Court restored the original summons order passed by the Special Judge (POCSO), Kasganj.

The Supreme Court also requested the National Judicial Academy, Bhopal to constitute a five-member Committee of Experts, to prepare a comprehensive report on the matter of ‘Developing Guidelines to Inculcate Sensitivity and Compassion into Judges and Judicial Processes in the Context of Sexual Offences and other Vulnerable Cases’. Accordingly, the suo motu case was disposed of with various directions. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Surya Kant.

Distinction Between ‘Preparation’ and ‘Attempt’ 

The Supreme Court concluded that a prima facie case for attempt to commit rape was made out, rendering the High Court’s findings patently erroneous of the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence (¶14). The Supreme Court to differentiate between preparation and attempt reiterated State of Madhya Pradesh v Mahendra alias Golu (2022) 12 SCC 442 that an “attempt” to commit an offence starts immediately after the completion of “preparation” (¶11) and the story of complainant represents the execution of mens rea (¶13). The allegations against the accused leaves no modicum of doubt that the accused proceeded with a predetermined intent to commit an offence under Section 376 of the IPC, and the crime was only halted due to the intervention of third-party witnesses as noted in the High Court’s judgment (¶13).

Need for a Compassionate Judicial Approach 

The Supreme Court noted that to meet the objective of delivering justice to the citizens, the judicial system must foster an environment of compassion and empathy (¶18). And, to create a fair and effective justice system, the decisions must reflect the ethos of compassion, humanity, and understanding (¶19). 

Constitution of a Committee of Experts 

The Supreme Court, while recognizing that past efforts to inculcate and nurture an inherent sensitivity and discernment into the approach of members of the judiciary have not borne the fruit that was expected (¶20). The Court while declining to lay down fresh guidelines without comprehensive understanding of the past endeavours, its on-ground results and suggestions of domain experts (¶21) issued the following directions:

1. The National Judicial Academy, through its Director, Justice Aniruddha Bose, former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, is requested to constitute a Committee of Experts, chaired by Justice Bose, comprising four domain experts from relevant fields (¶22).

2. The Committee shall prepare a comprehensive report on the matter of ‘Developing Guidelines to Inculcate Sensitivity and Compassion into Judges and Judicial Processes in the Context of Sexual Offences and other Vulnerable Cases’. The Committee shall take into account previous endeavours and the variety of on-ground experiences faced by different stakeholders across the judicial system, and prepare comprehensive recommendations. These  recommendations shall be in the form of ‘Draft Guidelines for the Approach of Judges and the Judicial System When Dealing with Cases of Sexual Offences and other Similarly Sensitive Occurrences Involving Vulnerable Victims, Complainants, and/or Witnesses’ (¶23).

3. The Committee shall bear in mind India’s linguistic diversity and compile offensive words and expressions across languages that constitute offences under penal laws but are openly used by members of society in local dialects, often due to a lack of understanding of their offensive nature. This will ensure that such words/expressions do not go unnoticed and that complainants/victims are empowered to present a better and fuller narrative of the trauma suffered by them (¶24). 

4. The Committee shall ensure that the Draft Guidelines are understood by victims and complainants, especially children, young women, and vulnerable sections of society (¶25). Accordingly, it shall be in simple language, and must be contextualised in the real and lived experiences of the stakeholders in the Indian Judicial Process (¶26).

5. The Committee may consider preparing translated versions to fully explain the various concepts to all readers (¶27). 

6. The report shall be comprehensive, including adequate explanations and illustrations, without restriction on length. (¶28)

7. The Committee may seek assistance from experts including linguists academicians, litigators, social scientists, and counsellors. (¶29)

8. The Committee is requested to submit its report within three months (¶32).

Prepared by Nikhil Kumar Chaubey

Centre for Research and Planning, Supreme Court of India

The Supreme Court decided the following questions in a consolidated batch of civil appeals filed against High Court judgments dismissing their first appeals under Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“2013 Act”) as barred by limitation:

1.  Whether, in cases where land acquisition proceedings were initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“1894 Act”) but the award was passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act, Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act governs such proceedings and the first appeal is maintainable under Section 74 of the 2013 Act rather than Section 54 of the 1894 Act.

2.  Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (“1963 Act”), providing for condonation of delay on satisfaction of sufficient cause, applies to first appeals preferred before the High Court under Section 74 of the 2013 Act, having regard to Section 103 of the 2013 Act and Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act.

The Supreme Court allowed all the appeals. The judgment was authored by Justice M.M. Sundresh. On the incidental question, the Court held that Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act applies to all cases where awards are passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act, and that first appeals from such awards are governed by Section 74 of the 2013 Act, not Section 54 of the 1894 Act (¶97(i)–(iii)). On the primary question, the Court held that Section 74 does not bar the application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act (¶97(iv)). Noting that the delays were largely not substantial and that remitting matters would prolong litigation, the Court itself allowed all applications for condonation of delay and set aside the impugned judgments on the limitation issue (¶82–83). State Governments were directed to issue appropriate directions to officers dealing with Section 74 appeals, and High Courts were directed to adopt a pragmatic rather than a pedantic approach in dealing with applications for condonation of delay (¶97(vii)–(viii)).

Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act: The Incidental Issue

Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act operates as a savings clause where proceedings were initiated under the 1894 Act but no award was passed under Section 11 thereof before the commencement of the 2013 Act: all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply to such proceedings (¶¶15–16). Rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements, however, cannot be extended retrospectively, as no new benefit can be granted without statutory prescription (¶17). The Court relied on Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal [(2020) 8 SCC 129] and Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited v. Deepak Agarwal [(2023) 6 SCC 512], which clarified that where the award is passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act, the acquisition proceedings continue under that Act, making Section 74 the applicable appellate provision rather than Section 54 of the 1894 Act (¶¶ 17, 97(i)–(iii)).

Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act: Express Exclusion as the General Rule

The Law Commission’s 3rd Report of 1956 recommended that Sections 4 to 24 should apply to all special and local laws, leaving the Legislature to exclude them in a given case (¶50). Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act, enacted pursuant to this recommendation, triggers the activation of Sections 4 to 24 for all special or local laws prescribing a period of limitation different from the Schedule; and in the absence of an express exclusion, Sections 4 to 24 must be read into such special or local law (¶¶59, 62). The Court further clarified that extension under Section 5 of the 1963 Act is conceptually distinct from exclusion under Part III (Sections 12 to 24): while Sections 12 to 24 operate on the computation of the period of limitation by excluding certain time, Section 5 extends the period itself, and the two operate in entirely different fields (¶58). The compliance of Section 29(2) is mandatory; and an exception arises only where there is an express exclusion (¶62). A piecemeal application of Section 29(2), accepting only the part that imports the limitation period of the special law while ignoring the part that activates Sections 4 to 24, is impermissible (¶60). The onus lies heavily on the party claiming implied exclusion to discharge that burden through the scheme of the legislation (¶90). The Court distinguished Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narian Mishra [(1974) 2 SCC 133], which concerned the Representation of the People Act, 1951, a legislation containing Section 86, an express provision mandating summary dismissal of election petitions filed beyond the prescribed period, making the exclusion clear and peremptory on the face of the statute; no such provision exists in the 2013 Act (¶90).

Section 74 of the 2013 Act and Section 5 of the 1963 Act

Section 5 of the 1963 Act applies to an appeal or an application and not to suits or original proceedings (¶56). The Collector, not being a court, acts throughout as a statutory, executive, or quasi-judicial authority; accordingly, no provision of the 1963 Act, including Section 5, applies to proceedings before the Collector or to the Collector’s function of making a reference (¶¶30, 74). It is only at the stage of the Authority that an out-and-out judicial forum enters the 2013 Act scheme for the first time. An award by the Authority under Section 69 partakes the character of a decree, marking this initiation of judicial proceedings (¶¶33, 74). Section 74 provides a statutory right of first appeal on facts and on law against such an award; the appellate proceeding before the High Court is a continuation of the original proceedings before the Authority (¶75). The proviso to Section 74, while permitting filing within a further 60 days, does not extend the period of limitation but merely brings a delayed filing within the ambit of the main provision (¶35). Section 74, read with its proviso, deals with only one period of limitation of 60 days; the period in the proviso gets subsumed within Section 74(1), and the Court found no express exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act anywhere in Section 74 (¶76). The 2013 Act, being a subsequent legislation, was consciously enacted without excluding Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act; to introduce words of exclusion absent from Section 74 through construction would be impermissible (¶77). Since Section 74 deals with the determination of just, fair, and adequate compensation under a beneficial enactment, a liberal approach must be adopted both under the proviso and on an application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act (¶80). The period of limitation under Section 74 must accordingly be read into the Schedule by the invocation of Section 3 of the 1963 Act (¶81).

Section 103 of the 2013 Act

The Court held that the 2013 Act, though a special law and a complete code to a large extent, does not bar any assistance from other enactments to give effect to its avowed object; any contra interpretation would result in the destruction of the Act's own purpose and must be avoided (¶41). Section 103 of the 2013 Act states that the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force; the completeness of the 2013 Act comes from borrowing from other enactments, including the 1963 Act (¶37). Any interpretation of Section 74 that bars the application of other enactments would render Section 103 redundant and otiose, amounting to striking down the provision itself without a challenge (¶78). An interpretation to the contrary would result in both Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act and Section 103 of the 2013 Act vanishing from the respective statutes, which is wholly impermissible; where two interpretations are possible, the one that facilitates the filing of an appeal must be approved (¶79).

Accountability and Directions to State Governments

The approximately 530 appeals before the Court were described as “classic examples of official connivance” between officials and their counsel, with copy applications often not filed within the time prescribed pursuant to judgments of the Reference Courts (¶84). Accountability being an important facet in a constitutional democracy, the repeated failure to pursue remedies within time cannot be brushed aside as mere negligence and calls for fixing responsibility on the erring officials (¶85). State Governments were directed to put in place better management and monitoring systems and to issue appropriate directions to officers dealing with Section 74 appeals to ensure timely filing (¶¶85, 97(vii)). The Court cited Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India [(2023) 10 SCC 531] for the principle that a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach must be adopted in condoning delays by State instrumentalities, and directed High Courts to avoid a pedantic approach in dealing with applications for condonation of delay (¶¶85, 97(viii)).

Prepared by Sahil Rathee

Centre for Research and Planning, Supreme Court of India