महत्वपूर्ण निर्णय सारांश

(i) Whether the accused persons have only ‘prepared’ to commit the offence of rape or moved beyond that to have ‘attempted’ to commit the said crime.

(ii) Whether guidelines are required for inculcating sensitivity and compassion into judicial approach while dealing with matters involving sexual offences.

The Supreme Court registered a suo motu writ petition following a letter from an organisation named ‘We the Women of India’, which highlighted a judgment dated 17.03.2025 passed by a Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court. The letter noted that the observations made and reasoning adopted by the Single Judge was erroneous and insensitive. Similar concerns were also raised in connected matters assailing the same judgment, filed by NGOs registered in Kolkata and Delhi, along with the complainant, who is the mother of the minor victim. 

In the said judgment, the High Court had modified order for summons issued by a Special Judge (POCSO) to two accused persons, revising the charge from Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”) read with Section 18 of the (“POCSO”) to a lesser charge under Section 354B of the IPC read with Section 9 and 10 of POCSO. The Supreme Court on 26.03.2025 stayed the observations of the High Court in paragraphs 21, 24 and 26, and subsequently on 08.12.2025 stayed the operation of the entire judgment of the High Court.

The factual allegations as recorded in the High Court’s Judgment indicated that the accused took a minor victim on their motorcycle under the guise of dropping her home, dragged her near a culvert, and committed sexually offensive acts. They only fled the scene because two witnesses reached after hearing the victim's shrieks. The High Court had concluded that these actions were limited to “preparation” to commit the offence of rape and did not amount to an “attempt”. NGOs and the complainant-mother challenged this decision before the Supreme Court.

A Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court allowed the Criminal Appeals, setting aside the impugned judgment of the High Court dated 17.03.2025. The Court restored the original summons order passed by the Special Judge (POCSO), Kasganj.

The Supreme Court also requested the National Judicial Academy, Bhopal to constitute a five-member Committee of Experts, to prepare a comprehensive report on the matter of ‘Developing Guidelines to Inculcate Sensitivity and Compassion into Judges and Judicial Processes in the Context of Sexual Offences and other Vulnerable Cases’. Accordingly, the suo motu case was disposed of with various directions. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Surya Kant. 

Distinction Between ‘Preparation’ and ‘Attempt’ 

The Supreme Court concluded that a prima facie case for attempt to commit rape was made out, rendering the High Court’s findings patently erroneous of the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence (¶14). The Supreme Court to differentiate between preparation and attempt reiterated State of Madhya Pradesh v Mahendra alias Golu (2022) 12 SCC 442 that an “attempt” to commit an offence starts immediately after the completion of “preparation” (¶11) and the story of complainant represents the execution of mens rea (¶13). The allegations against the accused leaves no modicum of doubt that the accused proceeded with a predetermined intent to commit an offence under Section 376 of the IPC, and the crime was only halted due to the intervention of third-party witnesses as noted in the High Court’s judgment (¶13).

Need for a Compassionate Judicial Approach 

The Supreme Court noted that to meet the objective of delivering justice to the citizens, the judicial system must foster an environment of compassion and empathy (¶18). And, to create a fair and effective justice system, the decisions must reflect the ethos of compassion, humanity, and understanding (¶19). 

Constitution of a Committee of Experts 

The Supreme Court, while recognizing that past efforts to inculcate and nurture an inherent sensitivity and discernment into the approach of members of the judiciary have not borne the fruit that was expected (¶20). The Court while declining to lay down fresh guidelines without comprehensive understanding of the past endeavours, its on-ground results and suggestions of domain experts (¶21) issued the following directions:

1. The National Judicial Academy, through its Director, Justice Aniruddha Bose, former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, is requested to constitute a Committee of Experts, chaired by Justice Bose, comprising four domain experts from relevant fields (¶22).

2. The Committee shall prepare a comprehensive report on the matter of ‘Developing Guidelines to Inculcate Sensitivity and Compassion into Judges and Judicial Processes in the Context of Sexual Offences and other Vulnerable Cases’. The Committee shall take into account previous endeavours and the variety of on-ground experiences faced by different stakeholders across the judicial system, and prepare comprehensive recommendations. These  recommendations shall be in the form of ‘Draft Guidelines for the Approach of Judges and the Judicial System When Dealing with Cases of Sexual Offences and other Similarly Sensitive Occurrences Involving Vulnerable Victims, Complainants, and/or Witnesses’ (¶23).

3. The Committee shall bear in mind India’s linguistic diversity and compile offensive words and expressions across languages that constitute offences under penal laws but are openly used by members of society in local dialects, often due to a lack of understanding of their offensive nature. This will ensure that such words/expressions do not go unnoticed and that complainants/victims are empowered to present a better and fuller narrative of the trauma suffered by them (¶24). 

4. The Committee shall ensure that the Draft Guidelines are understood by victims and complainants, especially children, young women, and vulnerable sections of society (¶25). Accordingly, it shall be in simple language, and must be contextualised in the real and lived experiences of the stakeholders in the Indian Judicial Process (¶26).

5. The Committee may consider preparing translated versions to fully explain the various concepts to all readers (¶27). 

6. The report shall be comprehensive, including adequate explanations and illustrations, without restriction on length. (¶28)

7. The Committee may seek assistance from experts including linguists academicians, litigators, social scientists, and counsellors. (¶29)

8. The Committee is requested to submit its report within three months (¶32).

Prepared by Nikhil Kumar Chaubey

Centre for Research and Planning, Supreme Court of India

The Supreme Court decided the following questions in a consolidated batch of civil appeals filed against High Court judgments dismissing their first appeals under Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“2013 Act”) as barred by limitation:

1.  Whether, in cases where land acquisition proceedings were initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“1894 Act”) but the award was passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act, Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act governs such proceedings and the first appeal is maintainable under Section 74 of the 2013 Act rather than Section 54 of the 1894 Act.

2.  Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (“1963 Act”), providing for condonation of delay on satisfaction of sufficient cause, applies to first appeals preferred before the High Court under Section 74 of the 2013 Act, having regard to Section 103 of the 2013 Act and Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act.

The Supreme Court allowed all the appeals. The judgment was authored by Justice M.M. Sundresh. On the incidental question, the Court held that Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act applies to all cases where awards are passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act, and that first appeals from such awards are governed by Section 74 of the 2013 Act, not Section 54 of the 1894 Act (¶97(i)–(iii)). On the primary question, the Court held that Section 74 does not bar the application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act (¶97(iv)). Noting that the delays were largely not substantial and that remitting matters would prolong litigation, the Court itself allowed all applications for condonation of delay and set aside the impugned judgments on the limitation issue (¶82–83). State Governments were directed to issue appropriate directions to officers dealing with Section 74 appeals, and High Courts were directed to adopt a pragmatic rather than a pedantic approach in dealing with applications for condonation of delay (¶97(vii)–(viii)).

Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act: The Incidental Issue

1.  Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act operates as a savings clause where proceedings were initiated under the 1894 Act but no award was passed under Section 11 thereof before the commencement of the 2013 Act: all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply to such proceedings (¶¶15–16). Rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements, however, cannot be extended retrospectively, as no new benefit can be granted without statutory prescription (¶17). The Court relied on Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal [(2020) 8 SCC 129] and Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited v. Deepak Agarwal [(2023) 6 SCC 512], which clarified that where the award is passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act, the acquisition proceedings continue under that Act, making Section 74 the applicable appellate provision rather than Section 54 of the 1894 Act (¶¶ 17, 97(i)–(iii)).

Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act: Express Exclusion as the General Rule

2.  The Law Commission’s 3rd Report of 1956 recommended that Sections 4 to 24 should apply to all special and local laws, leaving the Legislature to exclude them in a given case (¶50). Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act, enacted pursuant to this recommendation, triggers the activation of Sections 4 to 24 for all special or local laws prescribing a period of limitation different from the Schedule; and in the absence of an express exclusion, Sections 4 to 24 must be read into such special or local law (¶¶59, 62). The Court further clarified that extension under Section 5 of the 1963 Act is conceptually distinct from exclusion under Part III (Sections 12 to 24): while Sections 12 to 24 operate on the computation of the period of limitation by excluding certain time, Section 5 extends the period itself, and the two operate in entirely different fields (¶58). The compliance of Section 29(2) is mandatory; and an exception arises only where there is an express exclusion (¶62). A piecemeal application of Section 29(2), accepting only the part that imports the limitation period of the special law while ignoring the part that activates Sections 4 to 24, is impermissible (¶60). The onus lies heavily on the party claiming implied exclusion to discharge that burden through the scheme of the legislation (¶90). The Court distinguished Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narian Mishra [(1974) 2 SCC 133], which concerned the Representation of the People Act, 1951, a legislation containing Section 86, an express provision mandating summary dismissal of election petitions filed beyond the prescribed period, making the exclusion clear and peremptory on the face of the statute; no such provision exists in the 2013 Act (¶90).

Section 74 of the 2013 Act and Section 5 of the 1963 Act

3.  Section 5 of the 1963 Act applies to an appeal or an application and not to suits or original proceedings (¶56). The Collector, not being a court, acts throughout as a statutory, executive, or quasi-judicial authority; accordingly, no provision of the 1963 Act, including Section 5, applies to proceedings before the Collector or to the Collector’s function of making a reference (¶¶30, 74). It is only at the stage of the Authority that an out-and-out judicial forum enters the 2013 Act scheme for the first time. An award by the Authority under Section 69 partakes the character of a decree, marking this initiation of judicial proceedings (¶¶33, 74). Section 74 provides a statutory right of first appeal on facts and on law against such an award; the appellate proceeding before the High Court is a continuation of the original proceedings before the Authority (¶75). The proviso to Section 74, while permitting filing within a further 60 days, does not extend the period of limitation but merely brings a delayed filing within the ambit of the main provision (¶35). Section 74, read with its proviso, deals with only one period of limitation of 60 days; the period in the proviso gets subsumed within Section 74(1), and the Court found no express exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act anywhere in Section 74 (¶76). The 2013 Act, being a subsequent legislation, was consciously enacted without excluding Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act; to introduce words of exclusion absent from Section 74 through construction would be impermissible (¶77). Since Section 74 deals with the determination of just, fair, and adequate compensation under a beneficial enactment, a liberal approach must be adopted both under the proviso and on an application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act (¶80). The period of limitation under Section 74 must accordingly be read into the Schedule by the invocation of Section 3 of the 1963 Act (¶81).

Section 103 of the 2013 Act

4.  The Court held that the 2013 Act, though a special law and a complete code to a large extent, does not bar any assistance from other enactments to give effect to its avowed object; any contra interpretation would result in the destruction of the Act's own purpose and must be avoided (¶41). Section 103 of the 2013 Act states that the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force; the completeness of the 2013 Act comes from borrowing from other enactments, including the 1963 Act (¶37). Any interpretation of Section 74 that bars the application of other enactments would render Section 103 redundant and otiose, amounting to striking down the provision itself without a challenge (¶78). An interpretation to the contrary would result in both Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act and Section 103 of the 2013 Act vanishing from the respective statutes, which is wholly impermissible; where two interpretations are possible, the one that facilitates the filing of an appeal must be approved (¶79).

Accountability and Directions to State Governments

5.  The approximately 530 appeals before the Court were described as “classic examples of official connivance” between officials and their counsel, with copy applications often not filed within the time prescribed pursuant to judgments of the Reference Courts (¶84). Accountability being an important facet in a constitutional democracy, the repeated failure to pursue remedies within time cannot be brushed aside as mere negligence and calls for fixing responsibility on the erring officials (¶85). State Governments were directed to put in place better management and monitoring systems and to issue appropriate directions to officers dealing with Section 74 appeals to ensure timely filing (¶¶85, 97(vii)). The Court cited Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India [(2023) 10 SCC 531] for the principle that a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach must be adopted in condoning delays by State instrumentalities, and directed High Courts to avoid a pedantic approach in dealing with applications for condonation of delay (¶¶85, 97(viii)).

Prepared by Sahil Rathee

Centre for Research and Planning, Supreme Court of India